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Applying social and behavioral science research to preserve global security and to understand, prevent, and mitigate armed conflict and violent extremism.

Randy Borum
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August 2, 2010
04:00 PM
67 views

The Science of Interpersonal Trust

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

Interpersonal trust - a willingness to accept vulnerability or risk based on expectations regarding another person’s behavior – is a vitally important concept for human behavior, affecting our interactions both with adversaries and competitors as well as with allies and friends. Indeed, interpersonal trust could be said to be responsible in part for nudging competitors towards becoming allies, or – if betrayed – leading friends to become adversaries.

This document summarizes the state of the art (and science) in interpersonal trust research, describing how researchers define trust and its components, exploring a range of theories about how people decide whether to trust, and describing how trust may work differently for some people than for others. This primer will not critique all existing studies and their methods. It is written as a relatively non-technical overview for individuals whose personal success depends on the development of trust and for researchers seeking to better understand how trust has been studied and operationalized, to date.
... Read more »

Randy Borum. (2010) The Science of Interpersonal Trust. Monograph. info:/

June 18, 2010
12:00 AM
29 views

Starting a War in the Aftermath of Disaster

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

A new study conducted by Travis Nelson from University of Vermont carefully examines the security nexus of natural disaster and armed conflict over the past half century.... Read more »

Nelson, T. (2010) When disaster strikes: on the relationship between natural disaster and interstate conflict. Global Change, Peace , 22(2), 155-174. DOI: 10.1080/14781151003770788

June 14, 2010
10:02 AM
91 views

The "Urban Legend" of Civilian Casualty Rates in War

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

Adam Roberts - part of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War - has a very thoughtful in the latest issue of Survival, titled: "Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims Civilians?".Roberts takes on the commonly made assertion that in contemporary warfare (since the early 1900s)that 80-90% of war victims/casualties have been civilians. This would suggest a civilian-military death ratio of 9:1. It is easy for such a startling statistic to take on a life of its own - and it has, according to Roberts, having been cited without empirical support in venues as influential as the British Medical Journal.He traces the origins of the claim back to a set of statements in a couple of influential reports in the early 1990s that were broad inferential estimates based on some questionable assumptions - not verified counts of any kind - and that used a very broad definition of what constitutes a war casualty - including suffering from famine or displacement.Roberts also traces some of the skepticism of these claims by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), contradictory data from the World Health Organization (WHO), and the intellectual melee that ensued from the Human Security Report, which has argued that in today's wars "actual death tolls are relatively small—and have been decreasing" (p.2) and said the notion that 90% of those killed by fighting in today’s wars are civilians is a "myth". Her goes on to present evidence of civilian and military casualties from particular wars that suggest a much lower ratio.He concludes with a spirited call for better empirical data from actual wars and a caution that propagating the 9:1 ratio proposition - though intended to focus attention on protecting civilians - may have had at least three deleterious effects:Firstly, it has not merely reflected, but also perpetuated, a misleadingly homogenised view of contemporary wars, when in reality each of them (and even each party to them) is unique in its character and in its consequences for civilians. Secondly, it has obscured significant achievements in civilian protection resulting from actions by states, international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). And thirdly, it has diverted attention from substantial issues to disputes about numbers and methodologies (pp. 128-129).Adam Roberts (2010). Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims Civilians? Survival, 52 (3), 115-136 : 10.1080/00396338.2010.494880a2a_linkname="Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict";a2a_linkurl="http://globalcrim.blogspot.com";... Read more »

Adam Roberts. (2010) Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims Civilians?. Survival, 52(3), 115-136. info:/10.1080/00396338.2010.494880

May 17, 2010
12:25 PM
111 views

On Patriotism & Prejudice

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

National Identity and Outgroup PrejudiceHaving a strong national identity does not necessarily foster prejudice or derogation of other groups. Antipathy toward other groups depends more on how one’s identity is represented - whether people draw us-them distinctions based on ethnic factors or civic factors, like citizenship, according to a new study published in the British Journal of Social Psychology.Professor Joke Meeus and colleagues from Katholieke Universiteit in Belgium undertook this study to better understand the nature of what is often called “intergroup discrimination.” Social psychologists have long observed that people construct their identities (sense of self) based – at least in part – on their perceived “membership” in various groups or categories. For example, a person might define him/herself as being both British and Muslim. People who are considered British would comprise one ingroup. People who are considered Muslim might comprise another ingroup. Those who are non-British would be outgroup members, as would those who are non-Muslim.Two common dynamics that tend to drive ingroup-outgroup (intergroup) relationships are: (1) ingroup favoritism (a tendency to evaluate and behave more favorably toward other ingroup members); and (2) outgroup derogation (a tendency to evaluate and behave more negatively toward other outgroup members. The authors of this study suggest, however that these two dynamics are not always interrelated – and that they may vary independently. They cite prior research from political science showing that the strength of one’s national (ingroup) identity often does not predict the degree of outgroup derogation They believe this may occur because ingroup membership criteria are not always very clear cut. So – notions of what constitutes the British ingroup for some might be bounded by native birth, for others it may be citizenship, still others might more broadly include current residency (to include immigrants). For some people and for some countries, national identity tends to be based more on ethnic factors; that is, ethnicity, not citizenship, drives the ingroup-outgroup distinction.This study sought to explore the role of these different bases for ingroup/national identity membership in understanding the connections between in-group identification and ethnic prejudice. They conducted this inquiry using the national context of Flanders, Belgium.They assessed Flemish in-group identification with the following four items: ‘I am proud to be Flemish’ ‘Being Flemish is important to me’ ‘I feel a bond with Flemish people’ ‘I feel Flemish’Then the researchers assessed the basis for (representation of) participants’ national identification, using a series of items measuring an ethnic basis (e.g., ‘Mixing Flemish culture with other cultures should be prevented’) and a civic basis (e.g., ‘Someone who settles permanently in Flanders and who follows all basic rules, should receive all rights as a Flemish citizen’). Finally, the degree of ethnic prejudice was measured by a series of items pertaining to ‘Moroccans who are born in Belgium or who have lived here throughout most of their lives’ (e.g., ‘Their presence is a threat to our own culture and customs’).The team conducted two studies. The first included 397 Dutch-speaking first year psychology students from a Belgian university, and the second study – a longitudinal one (measuring at two time points, one year apart) to predict prejudice over time– surveyed 443 Dutch-speaking 11th grade secondary school students.They found the following results:People with higher national (ingroup) identification tended to base their identification more on ethnic than on civic factors.People with higher national (ingroup) identification tended to have higher levels of ethnic prejudice.So –“ the more people identify with their Flemish in-group, the more likely they are to view this in-group in more ethnic terms, which in turn, should lead them to exhibit more ethnic prejudice” (p. 317).A similar trend happened when they looked at the relationships over time. Students with a high initial level of national (ingroup) identification, tended over time, to increasingly rely on an ethnic basis for that identity, and that ethnic focus later produced higher levels of ethnic (outgroup) prejudice. The implication seems to be that prejudice and the basis for national identity seem to be interrelated. People with a strong national identification tend to become more prejudiced than those with a weaker national identification. And, importantly, the greater prejudice seems to be caused by the fact they increasingly regard or represent the ingroup-outgroup differences in ethnic terms.The flip side is that people who are more prejudiced also seem to base their national identity more on ethnic distinctions – perhaps to justify their outgroup derogation.One wonders how this might apply in an ethnically complex area, where the sense of collective national identity is still relatively weak. And how this might affect outside efforts to shape or strengthen that identity. And how it might affect outgroup perceptions of those seeking to shape or strengthen others' ingroup identity.Meeus, J., Duriez, B., Vanbeselaere, N., & Boen, F. (2010). The role of national identity representation in the relation between in-group identification and out-group derogation: Ethnic versus civic representation British Journal of Social Psychology, 49 (2), 305-320 DOI: 10.1348/014466609X451455a2a_linkname="Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict";a2a_linkurl="http://globalcrim.blogspot.com";... Read more »

Meeus, J., Duriez, B., Vanbeselaere, N., & Boen, F. (2010) The role of national identity representation in the relation between in-group identification and out-group derogation: Ethnic versus civic representation. British Journal of Social Psychology, 49(2), 305-320. DOI: 10.1348/014466609X451455

April 2, 2010
03:36 PM
200 views

Mapping the Militant-Extremist Mindset

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

About a year ago, we reported here at SGSAC on a study attempting to identify key themes that might characterize a militant-extremist mindset. Gerard Saucier (University of Oregon) and his colleagues pored through numerous documents and extracted sixteen themes. Members of that same research team - this time led by Lazar Stankov (National Institute of Education in Singapore) - have continued this line of inquiry and spotted three central "psychological ingredients of the militant extremist mindset."They started with a list of 56 statements they extracted from various materials produced by and about terrorists. The statements were presented to 2,424 college students (more than half of whom were female, average age of 21) from North America (USA), Eastern Europe (Serbia, Slovakia, Belarus), Latin America (Chile, Guatemala), and Asia (Malaysia, South Korea, China). They forthrightly note: "Needless to say, this sampling framework limits the generalization of the present findings beyond the student population." An important point, to be sure.Students rated their agreement with each of the 56 militant-extremist statements on a 5-point Likert-type scale, from "strongly and completely disagree" to "strongly and completely agree." They also completed a measure of personality, a measure of social attitudes, and a measure of values.Their first step was was to conduct an exploratory factor analysis of the items to see whether and how they might cluster together into themes. Thirty six of the statements seemed to fit within three general factors. The researcher examined the content of the items in each factor and removed twelve additional statements that seemed not to fit with the others in their cluster (factor). This left 24 items for further analysis - revealing the following three underlying factors:Proviolence: (statements indicating acceptance of, justification, and even advocacy of the use of violence in certain circumstances like revenge or to gain redemption)Vile World: (statements indicating there is something importantly wrong with the world in which we live) Divine Power: (statements referencing a divine power, heaven and God - role of martyrdom and rewards in the afterlife)The three factors were fairly distinct and independent of each other. There was a modest correlation between VIle World and Divine Power.They conclude "on the basis of our findings, we can say that an extremist militant mindset consists of three main ingredients:"first there is a belief that violence is not only an option, but it may be a useful means to achieve one's personal and social goals.""there needs to be an 'enemy' such as the West or a belief in a corrupt of Vile World that is perceived as the cause of suffering of the group to which the person belongs."violence needs to be sanctioned by someone, perhaps by a superior power (Divine Power/God).Next, the items were composed as scales (Alpha coefficients .74-.80). While there was a broader range of views about (and item endorsement for) Vile World and Divine Power, only a small proportion (3.5% of the overall sample) scored "unusually high" on the Proviolence dimension.The Divine Power dimension seemed to simply be a measure of tradition-oriented religious beliefs. It did not seem to contain anything unique - by itself - as a facet of a militant extremist mindset.The Proviolence dimension was strongly related to social attitudes supporting unmitigated pursuit of self-interest, to personality disintegration, and power as a value. It was negatively related to positive personality traits and to values of benevolence, self-direction and universalism.Demographic differences: There were few differences between men and women on Vile World or Divine Power beliefs, but men did tend to score significantly higher on Proviolence.Between-Country differences: Respondent from the Asian countries tended to have somewhat higher Proviolence scores (though not indicating widespread endorsement of violence) than those in the other countries. Respondents from Serbia and Malysia tended to score higher than others on Vile World, while Chinese respondents had the lowest scores on this scale.The authors are clear that the objective of their research is not to develop a measure to identify terrorists. That's an important point to make, I think. Also, to their credit, they readily acknowledge the limitations of using a college student sample. While these three dimensions may not seem surprising, this is a line of research that has not been empirically investigated before - at least in this way. The multi-national sample also enhances the merit of its contribution - though we must continue to be cautious about not stereotyping people's beliefs just by their national citizenship (e.g., people from country X believe Y).The study also raises a potentially interesting set of questions about how those factors might operate to facilitate or constrain violent extremist activity. About 50 years ago, Rokeach advanced the notion of "dogmatism," which he characterized as having a closed cognitive system, authoritarian bent (or absolute adherence to a source of authority), and intolerance. The interactions of those components can produce a different result than any one of them individually. This might also turn out to be true for understanding the militant extremist mindset. The elements may not just be additive (more of them, resulting in greater militancy), but they may actually interact with or be conditioned on one another in ways that illuminate cognitive pathways or patterns (note the plural) toward ideologically or politically-motivated violence.Stankov, L., Saucier, G., & Knežević, G. (2010). Militant extremist mind-set: Proviolence, Vile World, and Divine Power. Psychological Assessment, 22 (1), 70-86 DOI: 10.1037/a0016925... Read more »

Stankov, L., Saucier, G., & Knežević, G. (2010) Militant extremist mind-set: Proviolence, Vile World, and Divine Power. Psychological Assessment, 22(1), 70-86. DOI: 10.1037/a0016925

February 1, 2010
10:53 AM
250 views

Authoritarianism, Totalitarianism, and Anti-Capitalism: Strange Bedfellows?

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

While much of the world is just now coming to grips with the demise of the old "superpower" system, a confluence of emerging ideologies and population-influence tactics are waiting eagerly in the wings.Last year, the folks from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Radio Free Asia published a report titled "Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians," which looked at new ways that totalitarian-like leaders are squelching political freedoms throughout the world through strategic use of media (including social media) and participating in the global marketplace of ideas.In a number of countries, leaders have ascended not so much with heavy-handed military might, but by using economic, social and political mechanisms to gain international legitimacy and foreign aid. They are not fighting the game; they are playing the game. They are not struggling against democracy, but rather, redefining it to suit their own ambitions.Undermining Democracy described changes in how authoritarians are doing business, but what about possible changes in the causes theselves - the underlying totalitarian ideologies?This is precisely what Ernest Sternberg addresses in his latest article: Purifying the World: What the New Radical Ideology Stands For, published in Orbis.Sternberg coins the term "world purificationism" to characterize this diverse and somewhat diffuse ethos that is more easily identified by what it opposes (imperialist capitalism) than by what it advocates. He identifies "world purificationism" as a social movement whose idealistic vision is the following:the anticipated defeat of imperial capitalist power in favor of a global network of beneficent culture-communities, which will empower themselves through grassroots participatory democracy, and maintain consistency across movements through the rectifying power of NGOs, thereby bringing into being a new era of global social justice and sustainable development, in which the diverse communities can harmoniously share an earth that has been saved from destruction and remade pristine. (p.65)That's right. The ideological centerpieces are global justice, environmental protection and economic sustainability. Could it be that the traditionally liberal earth-lovers and environmental evangelists (who Sternberg says "like the followers of totalitarianisms past, .. also see themselves as the vanguard for the highest humanitarian ideals... {and as} exemplars of purity, {and} as progenitors of the utmost in democracy and inter-cultural appreciation") are morphing into a totalitarian social movement? Or perhaps just that they have become willing to permit totalitarianism as a tactic in order to prevent the earth's apocalyptic self-destruction? Are the "disaffected and alienated" being targeted for mobilization against the capitalist powers?It seems in many ways reminiscent of modern anarchist movement: cohering around common enemies, defining themselves primarily by what they oppose, lacking hierarchical organization, bristling against state-level power, pro-environment, and anti-capitalism.Sternberg's article is worth a read and the evolving processes of this emerging movement are certainly worth our attention.Sternberg, E. (2010). Purifying the World: What the New Radical Ideology Stands For Orbis, 54 (1), 61-86 DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2009.10.006a2a_linkname="Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict";a2a_linkurl="http://globalcrim.blogspot.com";... Read more »

Sternberg, E. (2010) Purifying the World: What the New Radical Ideology Stands For. Orbis, 54(1), 61-86. DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2009.10.006

January 27, 2010
12:00 AM
163 views

Understanding Support for Militancy in Pakistan

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

Stability in Pakistan is in the fundamental interest of (at least most of) the global security community. And militancy is widely regarded as the most serious and present threat to that stability. Pew regularly conducts and reports on surveys of Pakistani public opinion. Policymakers and analysts also have their own set of working assumptions. As with all policy decisions our understanding and assumptions about the problem will affect, if not drive, our strategy and intervention. A recent study by Jacob N. Shapiro, an Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Codirector of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, and C. Christine Fair, Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University casts doubt upon some of the most common assumptions about support for militancy in Pakistan. It is based on survey data from less than a thousand Pakstanis and carries its own set of limitations, but it nevertheless raises some very important questions.... Read more »

Shapiro, J., & Fair, C. (2010) Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan. International Security, 34(3), 79-118. DOI: 10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.79

November 30, 2009
09:00 AM
357 views

Toward a Criminology of Genocide

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

In the most recent issue of the journal Theoretical Criminology (November 2009, Volume 13, No. 4 -Sage Publications), a special section is devoted to Criminology's potential contributions to the study and prevention of genocide. Nicole Rafter of Northeastern University sets the stage for the series of articles that follow. She uses as a platform for the discussion the 2009 book: Darfur and the Crime of Genocide by John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. xxii plus 269 pp. ISBN 978-0-521-51567-2 (hbk), 978-0-521-73135-5 (pbk)}, inviting four scholars of genocide and security issues to review the text and comment on its implications. All four reviewers offer generally positive appraisals, and seem to agree that the book has a strong theoretical and empirical grounding and makes a number of important contributions to the study of genocide. Rafter's lead-in offers the following introduction:Slowly and belatedly, criminology is incorporating genocide as one of the crimes it can and must try to account for. Many criminologists are, in fact, anxious to include genocide in their theorizing and teaching, but they have lacked an example, a road map to guide them through this difficult terrain. Darfur and the Crime of Genocide offers that guide. To bring it to the attention of other criminologists, I invited four scholars to review the book and assess its potential for the evolving criminology of genocide. The reviews are followed by a response in which John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond react not only to the reviewers, but also to a challenge to the propriety of their attempt to intervene in African politics. In a number of ways, the following contributions mark a milestone in the development of criminological thought. (p. 475)The first of the four reviews is provided by Joachim J. Savelsberg (Genocide, criminology, and Darfur, Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 477-480.) who praises the fact that the authors apply "a sociologically based criminology to genocide scholarship... and impressively link empirical social science with the jurisprudence of genocide." He highlights several key contributions, but particularly notes the merit of their "theory of offending" in genocide, which he summarizes in the following way:A nutshell version highlights the knowledge-related factors: precipitating conditions, especially (1) land competition and supremacist ideology produce Arab versus Black identities (or socially constructed racial groups) and thereby provide a vocabulary of motives and neutralization; they motivate (2) individualized racial intent (‘race’ as a vocabulary o motive) further promoted by field commanders with high levels of ‘social efficacy’ (as Ross Matsueda puts it) and ties to (and support from) the Sudanese government; and lead, via (3) frenzied collective action in which the yelling of racial epithets produces collectivized racial intent at the meso-level, back to (4) the macro-level with its patterns of a genocidal state as an endogenous system (that is, not explained by long-standing hatred or a defensive reaction to insurgency). (p 478)The next review comes from Bruce Hoffman, the well-known scholar on extremism and international security (Mobilizing criminology: The boundaries of criminological science and the politics of genocide, Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 481-485.). Hoffman describes how the book's authors use and discuss the 2004 Atrocities Documentation Survey (ADS) as an empirical basis for their arguments. The ADS was a study of 1136 Darfur refugees in UN Displacement Camps, commissioned by US Secretary of State Colin Powell to document the nature and scope of the Darfur atrocities and whether these atrocities should be characterized as a genocide. Hoffman comments specifically on their use of ADS data to derive mortality estimates, and its comparison to estimates from public health surveys : The authors argue that the survey reflects a ‘criminological’ approach, not a ‘public health’ approach, to violence: unlike public health surveys that primarily emphasize mortality within displacement camps due to disease and living conditions, criminological surveys incorporate full measures of the violence that caused individuals to become refugees. The two methodological approaches reflect contrasting political stances toward humanitarian intervention. Public health approaches refer to displacement as ‘complex humanitarian emergencies’, a term that conceals and neutralizes responsibility for mass violence but facilitates humanitarian access to refugees. Criminological approaches, in contrast, seek to advance a human rights perspective by investigating violence as crime, potentially resulting in decreased access for aid organizations. (p. 483)The next review by Hadar Aviram, titled: Mass atrocity and criminology (Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 487-493.) offers an over-arching critique, but also highlights a potentially intriguing facet of the book; how it explicates the role of dehumanization in genocidal crimes:Hagan and Rymond-Richmond also emphasize, through shocking and heartbreaking interview quotes, another dimension of the Darfur horror: the vicious, dehumanizing animus behind the attacks (Ch. 1 and p. 119). This raises the important question of the uniqueness of genocide. Dehumanization of the victim has been acknowledged as a feature that accompanies much ‘regular’ crime, not even just violent crime; it is not a phenomenon unique to genocidal settings, but in this latter context it manifests itself in a particularly chilling way. (p.490)Next up, Ross L. Matsueda (Toward a new criminology of genocide: theory, method, and politics, Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 495-502.) offers support for the discipline of Criminology to turn its attention to the crimes of genocide, but thinks its should perhaps focus more on legal remedies and responses. He also offers some additional theories or viewpoints that might guide the author's sociologically-driven analysis.Hagan and Rymond-Richmond have convincingly argued for a new criminology of genocide and have provided an exemplary empirical study for the new enterprise. They have shown that, for genocide, it is not enough to examine social disorganization (weak organization against crime), but rather, attention must be paid to organization in favor of crime, as it dynamically unfolds through collective action. Such action is intertwined with conventional organization in complex, historically specific ways. But the criminology of genocide must go further and critically evaluate the limitations of legal responses to genocide, examine the politics behind definitions of genocide, and demystify the political dynamics in which economically dominant nation-states at times seek to manipulate international legal institutions and principles so that their parochial interests are portrayed as the interests of all. (p. 500)Finally, the book's authors, John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond respond to and comment on the four reviews (Criminology confronts genocide: whose side are you on?Theoretical Criminology 2009 13: 503-511.). They begin with the general assertion that "it's about time" criminology invested in the study of genocide.It took criminology a long time to address some of its most important topics, for example, white-collar crime. It took criminology even longer to confront its more deadly neglected topics, namely genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Yet as we begin to study genocide it rapidly becomes apparent that our discipline brings a rich array of theories and methods to this crucial task. (p. 503)They go one to address the critical objections and suggestions raised by each of the reviewers, including some concerns about how and the extent to which they focus on "race" in their analyses.Race is a complex social construction and there is good reason to ask whether its role in our analysis is essential, or alternatively whether we might assign race too much importance when a discussion of ethnicity instead might better suffice. Matsueda and Hoffman point to the complexity of racial conflicts and Aviram suggests the nuance and legal advantage of a focus on ethnicity, while Savelsbe... Read more »

Rafter, N. (2009) Darfur and the Crime of Genocide by John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond: a symposium: Introduction. Theoretical Criminology, 13(4), 475-475. DOI: 10.1177/1362480609345440

November 13, 2009
04:37 PM
303 views

Virtual Counterinsurgency

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

What seems to give the West the most trouble in counterinsurgency (COIN) is not killing bad guys, but preventing new flocks of bad guys from continuously emerging. There is often talk of “draining the swamps” and “stemming the tide,” but violent extremism continues to spread – though in some circles more easily than others. The US and Western allies seem to understand – at some level – that the informational element of the battlespace reaches beyond traditional propaganda. They sincerely wish to “win hearts and minds” and engage in well-meaning efforts to do so, but global sentiments toward the West have not substantially improved.In the most recent issue of the journal, Small Wars & Insurgencies, David Betz from the Department of War Studies, at King's College in London (and author of the Kings of War blog) offers some insights about why we struggle so much with the virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency. Betz’s prose is much more eloquent than mine, so I will begin with his four most fundamental reasons –italicized in his words - why we’re not doing better.First, we do not take it seriously enough and therefore the tools we try to fight with are not fit for purpose. Betz notes here that the U.S. is not organized to function optimally in an information-dominated operational environment. The United States Information Agency (USIA) is now a thing of the past and no new single point of coordination has taken its place. The result is that efforts become fragmented and not handled with the kind of precision and care that would be commensurate with a high-priority government activity.Second, to the extent we do engage in the virtual dimension we concentrate too much on shifting Muslim opinion on an aspect of their religious faith that we as outsiders cannot effectively voice an opinion on. This is not to say we have not a stake in the outcome of that debate. We obviously do. But the surest way to make it go against us is to get involved in it. Betz believes the ‘war for Muslim minds’ pertaining to the proper interpretation of Jihad is not a war for outsiders (including the U.S.) to fight, and that to throw our hat in the ring probably does more harm than good.Third, we pay almost no attention to the audience to which we have access and understand: our own population, which includes Muslims in the West whose allegiance to global Jihad is what Islamists crave more than anything. He suggests that what Western nations seek to communicate to Muslims should seek not only to reach them who reside over there, but also to look inward. Even our best attempts are unlikely to change the minds of the most hardcore militants, so our efforts are better focused on prevention than on reforming the extremist mindset.Fourth, our efforts at narrative construction falter because they lack vertical coherence. The basic problem – Betz explains – is that “what we say does not always align with what we do.” He believes that the West has missed the idea that narratives have different levels, and to be persuasive, the messaging must cohere across those levels. If they do cohere, the message is more likely to “feel” true. If not, the message is unlikely to resonate at all. Betz offers a modified analysis of Ann Swindler’s view of ideology in which the levels of a narrative range from the most global – “idealized visions of the future of humanity” – to the most specific, such as individual and community norms about what people should and should not do and the consequences for those actions. The interstitial area between them is the space of the “strategic narrative” in which coherence and consistency matters more than rationality and logical precision of concepts. If we misunderstand the nature of the narrative, we lose the audience. As an example, he offers that ‘democratization’ actually lies at the global end of the continuum, but is often erroneously treated as a strategic-level message.A thoughtful analysis.Betz, D. (2009). The virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 19: 4, 510-540. DOI: 10.1080/09592310802462273a2a_linkname="Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict";a2a_linkurl="http://globalcrim.blogspot.com";... Read more »

Betz, D. (2008) The virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency. Small Wars , 19(4), 510-540. DOI: 10.1080/09592310802462273

July 29, 2009
04:07 PM
523 views

Everything You Know About Counterinsurgency History Is (possibly) Wrong!

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

Everything You Know About Counterinsurgency History Is (possibly) Wrong!I find it refreshing to hear an historian analyze ideas about counterinsurgency (COIN), if only to break the monotony of listening to COIN practitioners and doctrineers analyzing history. A new article by Professor Jonathan Gumz from USMA West Point makes the point.Gumz begins by noting that a flood of new scholarship on COIN has emerged - particularly in military journals - over the past six years. Articles typically include case studies and analyses of past conflict to make their points about the present. They mostly draw bright lines between conventional and unconventional wars and focus on non-European conflicts in the post-WWII era (mostly "Third World national liberation movements as well as to communist insurgencies"). In so doing, Gumz argues, scholars and warthinkers have created, rather than described, an historical COIN narrative to fit the demands of the present. That narrative of past warfare, he believes, is "deeply flawed.""This suggests that most of the current professional military scholarship on insurgency is driven primarily by the desire to make arguments about priorities in the here and now, not the relative importance of insurgency in the past."The critique does not focus on current COIN doctrine, but rather on attempts at scholarship and historical analysis. First, he notes, the common assumption that insurgency has always been a part of warfare, moots our ability to understand it actual historical origins."One could easily make the argument that professional military scholarship on insurgency has all but gutted the historical specificity of this form of warfare. This takes place because much of the scholarship maintains that insurgency has always been a part of warfare and thus immediately extracts insurgency from its historical moorings."A second problematic historical assumption, is that the past efforts to use "development" to further COIN objectives can be simply replicated in modern conflicts."Those who emphasize development-centered counterinsurgency seem curiously unaware of its origins. Instead, COIN advocates believe that development-centered counterinsurgency can simply be plucked from its larger historical context and deployed in the present."Gumz' summarizes his indictment of fuzzy - often revisionist- historical analysis in the following way:"The current professional literature’s approach to history is a curious one. Where the authors either explicitly or implicitly create a new narrative of insurgency to deploy against what they view as the dominant narrative of conventional warfare, that narrative remains cut off from the broader history of war itself. It remains trapped in a cage of either weakly connected ‘lessons learned’ or in a narrow narrative of American military memory. Modernization and development and their role in counterinsurgency strategy certainly do have a history, one embedded in the post-WorldWar II era, which the professional military literature largely looks past. In so doing, the literature lifts development and counterinsurgency out of its particular time and place. In turn, it falls directly into what one of the most perceptive current counterinsurgency experts, David Kilcullen, warns against and looks to simply apply the correct ‘lessons learned’ from the 1960s."So, if these assumptions are inaccurate - or at least overgeneralized - what historical truth is being overlooked?Gumz argues that Carl Schmitt's concept of "war autonomy", and its implications are conspicuously absent from the newly-created narrative. War autonomy focused on restricting war to the sphere of the state, and imposing limitations on enmity between opponents. Schmitt called it the ‘bracketing’ of war. There was much debate in the early modern era around such issues as the "question of an insurgent’s legal status, the qualifications of a belligerent, and the loyalty an occupied population owed a military occupation."These debates were part of the underpinnings of what would become the foundations of international laws of armed conflict. In its early modern form this was expressed in European public law (the jus publicum Europaeum). Gumz argues that "the appearance of insurgency was linked to the breakdown of bracketed conflict and with it the jus publicum Europaeum at the advent of the early twentieth century....Only with the collapse of the jus publicum Europaeum in the first half of the twentieth century in Europe did insurgency assume an increasingly prominent position in war. ... Insurgency’s appearance has less to do with technological changes or advancing stages of war than with normative changes in war’s boundaries."Gumz states at the outset of the article that his analysis "does not offer prescriptions for the present," but he concludes with some possible implications of viewing the history of insurgency in the alternative way he suggests:First, we have to avoid using history as a bland cupboard from which to raid lessons learned which serve to confirm ideas already arrived at in the present.Such an effort would compel us to abandon notions, deeply embedded in the COIN literature, that we live in an age of irreversible insurgency beyond our control.We might go a step further and decide that the lessons to draw from the conflict in Iraq since 2003 should have less to do with counterinsurgency. For that, in a sense, would be to accept an era of collapsed conflict. The new counterinsurgency tactics should be looked upon as temporary solutions to an aberrational situation, instead of charting a fundamentally new path. The real lessons of Iraq, historically seen, have far more to do with avoiding a botched occupation in the first place and thus eliding the problem of insurgency altogether.Consequently, understanding how to effectively occupy countries, what not to do so as to avoid an insurgency, should receive at least some attention as we begin to look back on the Iraq conflict.Finally, a more historical approach to insurgency should encourage us to abandon some of the dichotomies which distort far more than they clarify. As employed in the current literature, these dichotomies have overwhelmed historical events. They simply slot wars into different columns and thereby undermine attempts to understand the nature of conflicts.Gumz, J. (2009). Reframing the Historical Problematic of Insurgency: How the Professional Military Literature Created a New History and Missed the Past Journal of Strategic Studies, 32 (4), 553-588 DOI: 10.1080/01402390902986972a2a_linkname="Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict";a2a_linkurl="http://globalcrim.blogspot.com";... Read more »

Gumz, J. (2009) Reframing the Historical Problematic of Insurgency: How the Professional Military Literature Created a New History and Missed the Past. Journal of Strategic Studies, 32(4), 553-588. DOI: 10.1080/01402390902986972

July 16, 2009
07:09 PM
475 views

Natural Resources & Armed Conflict

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

Natural resources can make conflicts more deadly. When gems or oil/gas production exist inside a conflict zone, more combat deaths tend to result. This finding comes from an analysis of 258 worldwide conflicts conducted by Paivi Lujala from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology.Lujala's research builds on earlier studies showing linking the presence of natural resources to the onset and likelihood of armed conflict in a given area. His analysis extends this knowledge by focusing on the impact of these resources on conflict severity. Severity was measured by the total number of combat deaths and the average rate of combat deaths (which he refers to as a measure of "intensity"). He also was able to compare effects inside vs outside of conflict zones within a given country, rather than just using the country as a single geographic unit.The study examined three commonly occurring natural resources: (1) gemstone mining; (2) Hydrocarbon (crude oil/natrual gas) production; and (3) illicit drug cultivation (cocoa, opium poppy, & cannabis). Results are interesting and some are a bit surprising.Think for a moment about which of these three resources - gems, hydrocarbons, or drugs - you would immediately associate with an increase in combat deaths. Here's a hint - Two of them are linked to an increase in deaths and one is associated with fewer deaths. OK - if you read the headline, you know the answer. Drug cultivation inside conflict zones is linked to fewer - yes, fewer - combat deaths and a lower battle death rate. Tony Addison and colleagues - in analyzing African conflicts - have suggested that this kind of effect may occur because combatants on both sides of a conflict spend some proportion of their time looting resources rather than just killing each other.Gems and hydrocarbons, on the other hand, significantly raised the risk of severity. Gemstone production inside the conflict zone basically doubled the the number of conflict fatalities . Similarly, when oil and gas production existed inside the zone, more than twice as many combat deaths occurred as when that production was absent. The effect was most pronounced in secessionist conflicts. A seemingly significant mechanism in both cases is that conflicts seem to go on longer when these resources are inside the conflict zone. Longer conflicts, of course, tend to produce more deaths.Drilling down further (no pun intended), though, oil and gas production was associated with lower severity (lower rate and fewer deaths) when it was present in the country/region, but existed outside the conflict zone. Perhaps this is because the resources are less accessible to rebel combatants, and they continue to provide a source of revenue for the government/military, which may then be able to invest more in quashing the rebellion and ending the conflict sooner (shortening the duration).Though not the focus of this particular study, a: couple of incidental severity predictors emerged and are worth noting:The comparative size/strength of state military and rebel forces affects severity. The death toll tends to be highest when both force sizes are more equal. When the rebel forces are notable weaker, the rate of overall combat deaths seems to be lower.Conflicts tended to be more severe when they:occurred during the Cold War periodwere fought in mountainous terrainwere fought in more populated countries andwere internationalized internal conflictsConflicts tended to be less severe in countries that were more democratic and ethnically heterogeneous.Lujala, P. (2008). Deadly Combat over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53 (1), 50-71 DOI: 10.1177/0022002708327644... Read more »

Lujala, P. (2008) Deadly Combat over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(1), 50-71. DOI: 10.1177/0022002708327644

June 30, 2009
12:03 AM
508 views

Human Endeavor of War

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

Using more machines in war may diminish a force's chance of success according to a new study authored by Jason Lyall of Princeton and Isaiah Wilson III of the US Military Academy.... Read more »

Lyall, J., & Wilson, I. (2009) Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars. International Organization, 63(01), 67. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818309090031

June 8, 2009
10:31 AM
423 views

Democracy May Support Stability and Sustainability

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

Interested in building healthy, sustainable communities? Consider the value of democratic governance. Democracy may not be perfect, but perhaps it's the best imperfect system of government available.New research supports this conventional wisdom in a study of 45 African countries and 18 Latin American states over the time period 1996–2004. "While controlling for the material wealth of a country, education, population, armed conflict, ethnic tension, and debt, this pooled timed series analysis points to a strong positive correlation between democracy and good governance practices," according to Daniel Stockemer, a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science at the University of Connecticut.Stockemer begins by outlining the key ingredients of good governance as described in the scholarly literature: "Under the doctrine of good governance, states are obliged to perform their functions efficiently; to value non-corruptibility, to be responsive to civil society and to guarantee stability. Governments must also be transparent in the allocation of services and equitable in the distribution of goods." This kind of governance - based on the rule of law - promotes stable legal institutions and is a foundation for sustainable development. Accordingly, the study used four measures of good governance, based on World Bank Good Governance Indicators– (1) political stability and absence of violence, (2) government effectiveness, (3) control of corruption and (4) regulatory qualities.Applying systematic analysis and empirical research methods, he sought to evaluate the relationship between democracy and good governance for Africa and Latin America, focusing on two questions: (1) Are those African and Latin American countries that are democratically ruled better governed than states that are authoritarian? (2) Does a state’s move toward more democracy immediately trigger better governance performance?He found affirmative answers to both questions. More democratic states had better governance. And as states became more democratic, their governance practices also improved (though more so for Africa than Latin America).Stockemer concludes that "democracy is both a normative good and a form of government that leads to better governance, which in turn should trigger enhanced development in the form of high growth rates and advancement of living standards of the majority of the population."Stockemer, D. (2009). Does democracy lead to good governance? The question applied to Africa and Latin America Global Change, Peace & Security, 21 (2), 241-255 DOI: 10.1080/14781150902872141... Read more »

Stockemer, D. (2009) Does democracy lead to good governance? The question applied to Africa and Latin America. Global Change, Peace , 21(2), 241-255. DOI: 10.1080/14781150902872141

May 25, 2009
05:05 PM
567 views

Genocide: Criminological and CJ Perspectives

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

The June, 2009 issue of International Criminal Justice Review is a special issue devoted to genocide (defined here as the mass murder of people based on a specific agenda). It is guest edited by Professor John Winterdyk, who also serves as the outgoing chair (2009) of the International Section for the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences (ACJS). In his Introduction to the special issue, Professor Winterdyk notes that: "this is the first time a mainstream criminology/criminal justice journal has dedicated an entire issue to the subject of genocide."He begins by tracing the history of interest (or absence of interest) in genocide among criminal justice scholars, sharing the regret expressed by Day and Vandiver (2000) “that criminology, by largely ignoring the crime of genocide, has missed opportunities to both contribute to the field of genocide studies and to improve the specification of its own ideas” (p. 43). George Yacoubian examined papers presented at meeting of the American Society of Criminology (ASC) and ACJS as well as major criminology journals between 1990 and 1998, finding the topic of genocide to be all but absent from the agenda. A re-examination of ASC and ACJS conferences since 2000 shows a similar trend.A key objective among the authors in organizing this special issue is "to promote and encourage the study of genocide by criminologists and other scholars by publishing theoretical and empirical studies of genocide."His introduction briefly reviews the scope of genocide's global importance and challenge, citing data to show that throughout history - including in the 20th Century, the number of deaths from genocide have dramatically outpaced deaths resulting from war. He reviews some of the major international definitions and describes how the field of genocide studies has gown in other disciplines and academic sectors.He concludes with a synopsis of each of the six articles comprising the special issue, offering his hope that they show "there is considerable work that can be done by academics within criminology and criminal justice to help address and ameliorate genocide from happening in the future."Winterdyk, J. (2009). Genocide: International Issues and Perspectives Worthy of Criminal Justice Attention International Criminal Justice Review, 19 (2), 101-114 DOI: 10.1177/1057567709334217... Read more »

Winterdyk, J. (2009) Genocide: International Issues and Perspectives Worthy of Criminal Justice Attention. International Criminal Justice Review, 19(2), 101-114. DOI: 10.1177/1057567709334217

May 22, 2009
11:05 AM
543 views

How Armed Groups Make Money from Crime

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

In the latest issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Bilal Saab and Alexandra Taylor look at the different ways in which Colombian armed groups are connected to criminal activity.Transnational crime poses a daunting economic security problem. The volume of activity, including the $300-500 billion drug trade, accounts for between 2 and 5 % of the global GDP. Pretty remarkable.That connections exist between armed groups, including guerillas and insurgents, and transnational crime is rather obvious, but how the connections work is a bit more complicated. Some theories suggest that armed political group develop business arrangements with existing criminal organizations. Others, however, suggest that the once-politically motivated groups are themselves morphing into criminal enterprises. To put it simply: some partner with crime specialists, while others develop their own “in-house” capacity.“One fundamental characteristic, however, distinguishes armed insurgent groups from organized criminals. Participants in organized crime are motivated by the pursuit of profit, while armed insurgent groups use profits from crime as a means to support their political goals. For an armed group to transition into a criminal organization, it would need to supplant its political motivations with a drive to pursue illegal profits.” P. 457Saab and Taylor analyze these relationships among the major sub-state armed groups in modern Colombia: (1) The loose coalition of paramilitaries previously organized under the recently demobilized Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) and (2) what was once one of the largest guerrilla organizations in the world, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC). Both enterprises – the authors suggest – “derive the majority of their revenues from criminal activities, including kidnapping, extortion, and the protection, production, and trafficking of Andean-grown narcotics. However, paramilitary groups and FARC differ in the level and form of their participation in the international drug trade.” (p. 455)The authors note that “before its demobilization, the AUC developed the ability engage in almost all levels of drug production and trafficking without resorting to alliances with autonomous criminal organizations (p. 463-4).” They established a vertical presence in the drug trade, as they essentially morphed into a criminal enterprise. FARC, on the other hand, controlled a substantial amount of coca, but made some tactical alliances with a several criminal groups to handle the trafficking and distribution, and instead focused their “in-house” criminal infrastructure development to supportkidnapping and extortion.“Proponents of “in-house” criminality theories persuasively explain why armed groups and organized criminals would generally avoid collaboration. Such interaction is risky and may increase the likelihood of law enforcement surveillance, and generally such groups are likely to regard each other as market competitors and even political opponents, as violent political insurgents and terrorists seek to upset a comfortable status-quo enjoyed by criminal organizations. Despite these drawbacks, and based on the examples of FARC and the AUC, this article suggests two possible reasons why armed groups would choose to form alliances with criminal organizations over developing “in-house” criminal capabilities. First, some criminal activities—like trafficking and distributing narcotics—require resources and networks that are difficult and costly for an armed group to create. Second, the political environment may make certain criminal activities too politically costly for an armed group to be associated with; thus, armed groups may prefer to form short-term agreements with criminal groups and deny that their members take part in such activities.” P. 468Saab, B., & Taylor, A. (2009). Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32 (6), 455-475 DOI: 10.1080/10576100902892570... Read more »

Saab, B., & Taylor, A. (2009) Criminality and Armed Groups: A Comparative Study of FARC and Paramilitary Groups in Colombia. Studies in Conflict , 32(6), 455-475. DOI: 10.1080/10576100902892570

May 15, 2009
09:46 AM
456 views

Common Themes in Violent Extremist Ideologies.

by Randy Borum in Science of Global Security & Armed Conflict

Are there common structures or patterns to violent extremist ideologies, even when the content of the beliefs is dramatically different? Social and political scientists have explored elements of this question for decades using a variety of different methods. And the method does seem to matter. ... Read more »

Saucier, G., Akers, L., Shen-Miller, S., Knežević, G., & Stankov, L. (2009) Patterns of Thinking in Militant Extremism. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4(3), 256-271. DOI: 10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01123.x

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